19:00:31 #startmeeting tor-browser 19:00:31 Meeting started Mon Dec 19 19:00:31 2016 UTC. The chair is GeKo. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot. 19:00:31 Useful Commands: #action #agreed #help #info #idea #link #topic. 19:00:34 hi all! 19:00:38 hi 19:00:43 o/ 19:00:46 welcome to the last meeting for this year! 19:01:01 i guess we start as usual with the updates. 19:01:07 who wants to go first today? 19:01:53 * boklm can go first 19:01:57 go! 19:02:14 This past week I was at the reproducible build summit, and I worked on #17380. 19:02:21 This week I'm planning to write a short blog post about the reproducible build summit (similar to the one from last year), and continue working on #17380. 19:02:32 I'm also planning to take some days off 19:02:41 That's it for me 19:03:00 hi browser people 19:03:15 boklm: ximin will also work on one as part of the tor at the heart series 19:03:35 boklm: do you want me to add you to this email thread? 19:03:46 isabela: ah, yes 19:03:50 :) will do 19:04:39 i can go next i guess 19:04:59 last week i got the releases out and it seems all went well 19:05:22 i cut down my backlog and worked mainly on design documenation update 19:05:42 this week i mainly plan on traveling and continuing to work on the design doc update 19:05:53 that's it for me 19:06:06 the sandbox was released. it had bugs 19:06:08 I fixed 19:06:17 gonna do the updater background/robustness stuff 19:06:24 while I can 19:06:53 (I assume a trivial patch to torbutton to integrate that into the UI is possible for the next release) 19:07:13 i think so 19:07:16 (it's literally, "when the check for update thing is cliecked, send a control port command if an env var is set") 19:07:32 I think it will be low risk, because it never will get triggered on unsandboxed builds 19:07:41 and it can't get more broken than "the thing does nothing" 19:08:52 I'm not sure what will happen past the updater changes, we'll see 19:08:56 that's it for me 19:09:02 Do you mean the “Check for Tor Browser Update” menu item or also the about box, etc.? 19:09:48 just the menu item 19:09:53 the about box thing doesn't appear 19:10:14 it says "updates disabled by system administrator" 19:10:15 That sound fairly easy and fairly safe then. 19:10:16 sounds 19:10:20 ah, right 19:13:08 * mcs will go next 19:13:16 Last week, Kathy and I responded to OSX sandbox issues that have been reported (see #20989 and #21009). 19:13:22 We also took another look at the Tor Browser roadmap and will send GeKo some feedback later today. 19:13:29 In addition to that, we will continue to investigate the OSX sandbox problems this week. 19:13:33 Coming up, we will be taking some time off to enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays and to take care of end-of-year things for our company. 19:13:37 That’s all for now. 19:14:33 * arthuredelstein can go 19:14:57 Hi Everyone. :) This week I worked on #20680. 19:15:04 I have about 18 patches left to go. I have some questions about a few of them and I will be sending out emails about these soon. 19:15:15 So this week I will continue to work on rebasing and also I will look into #20981. 19:15:30 neat 19:15:33 And I'll be taking time off next week as well. :) 19:15:40 (ESR52 in this context is just geck-dev?) 19:15:43 *gecko 19:15:45 That's it for me. 19:15:55 ESR52 is the aurora branch of gecko-dev 19:15:55 “18 patches left to go” means we still have to many patches ;) 19:15:58 FF52 doesn't exist yet right? 19:16:00 ah k 19:16:14 It's not ESR yet ;) 19:16:17 too many also 19:16:19 no, still vaportware :) 19:16:28 vaporware even 19:16:36 It is great to get an early start of the rebasing! 19:16:49 umm… on the rebasing 19:16:56 mcs: We do still have too many, but not having to rebase the isolation patches is definitely a big help! 19:17:04 + getting the compiling going 19:17:31 "figuring out what is broken in my sandbox" 19:17:48 fwiw: i spent another deal of my spare time to get all issues for mingw-w64 on our radar 19:18:07 i got one patch uplifted but there are still things that are broken :/ 19:18:26 and it seems this time jacek does not have the time to fix all the tricky issues for us. 19:18:35 so... exciting! 19:19:33 anyway, who else is here for a status update? 19:19:37 I could go 19:19:57 hi! 19:20:02 Hi :) 19:20:04 This week I have done some more work on 20815 - preventing multiple instances of Orfox settings tabs, adding display logic to tor-browser-settings page elements, and implementing add-on setting persistance. 19:20:12 #20815 19:22:09 Will be available at #tor-mobile right after this meeting to discuss the upcoming alpha release 19:22:19 so where are we right now? 19:22:22 ah, okay 19:23:00 do you need anything from the other tor-browser folks? 19:23:08 input or something? 19:23:29 The foundation is done, and the UX is functional 19:24:12 Perhaps feedback on the current approach, and the goal of turning this into an embeddable WebExtension "module" 19:24:30 Any feedback is welcome, of course :) 19:24:57 https://git.synz.io/synzvato/tor-browser-settings/tree/master 19:26:55 okay. 19:27:17 ok, i guess we move on to the discussion part 19:27:25 first: next meeting time 19:28:01 i'll be traveling jan 2nd so i'd propose having our next regular meeting on january 9th 19:28:08 does that work for everyone? 19:28:16 yeah 19:28:18 yes 19:28:19 Sure 19:28:25 yes 19:28:55 seems so, good. i'll write a respective mail to tbb-dev these days then 19:29:23 do we have anything else up for discussion in today's meeting? 19:29:33 we should always kill the FF JS JIT 19:29:37 regardless of security slider setting 19:29:41 because it is dangerous and evil 19:30:05 oha :) 19:30:30 we should also consider our historical stance of "people will get confused" as a reason for defaulting the slider to low 19:30:46 and default it to high, so that people who want low security have to opt into it 19:31:11 the 2nd thing is probably more controversial than the first 19:31:12 :P 19:31:54 while i agree on JIT being scary i think the solution is a good sandbox :) 19:32:21 if the jit is scary that it takes containment that doesn't exist on all platforms yet 19:32:27 it shouldnt' be enabled in the name of performance 19:32:35 that's my opinion anyway >.> 19:32:53 Is the idea of a JIT scary in general or is the Mozilla implementation scary? 19:32:59 Also even with a sandbox a JIT doesn't necessarily stop deanonymization. 19:33:02 it's scary in general 19:33:06 arthuredelstein: correct 19:33:26 #21011 19:33:27 If we had perfect memory hardening then maybe it would be OK. But the world is a long way from that still. 19:33:45 the jit still would let bitfipping attacks and stuff work 19:33:53 better even with memory hardening 19:34:04 because most people don't have DDR4 or ECC memory 19:35:09 nb: I'm not sure if newer DDR is sufficient to solve the read disturb problem 19:35:49 (i changed the sandbox security slider default to high, so people need to opt into the JIT, but still) 19:37:03 looking at the fun in #19400 19:37:27 we got an idea who is using these things: 19:37:33 facebook and the like 19:37:58 ooof 19:38:09 it's just performance right? 19:38:23 like, with the JIT disabled stuff will just be slower rather than non-functional? 19:38:35 yes, afaik 19:38:39 slower in a way that it is basically non-functional 19:39:06 the fuck are they doing 19:39:13 i myself thought once debugging mega.nz issues that this breaks functionality 19:39:18 this isn't like "I want to play quak2 in my browser" or something right? 19:39:26 *quake 19:39:31 but no it took just minutes to load (literally) instead of seconds 19:39:37 no 19:39:51 my burning hatred for javascript rises 19:40:23 if it were just some gaming stuff that would be pretty easy to handle 19:40:39 Do we have any idea on how many people use tor browser with the security slider set to "YOLO" 19:40:53 vs increasing it? 19:41:30 i have no hard data 19:41:53 I have no sensible solution to this 19:42:06 that doesn't boil down to "change the default and educate people better about the risks" 19:42:14 "and set everyone that uses asm.js on fire" 19:42:22 yeah, i know 19:42:58 Do we care about mega.nz? Maybe turning of JIT is worth the few sites that break. 19:43:17 it's what, a file host? 19:43:19 The scripts in mega.nz are super sketchy for multiple reasons. 19:43:22 people will probably complain 19:43:24 yes 19:43:36 sure. but facebook? 19:43:45 we should rename "Low" to "Unsafe" 19:43:51 Does facebook not work with JIT disabled? 19:44:32 well "work", i don't know i did not spend my time doing performance measurements there 19:44:43 is it unusably slow? 19:44:52 I've never used spacebook 19:45:21 and it it is not facebook then it is an other major site that deploys that shit and makes our users screaming "Tor Browser is broken!1!" 19:45:26 *and if 19:45:29 yeah 19:45:41 One option could be to disable JIT for non-https. 19:45:51 I think renaming the seucirty slider to Unsafe and making uses having to opt into it is a good idea 19:45:53 Though I don't know how hard that is. 19:45:54 arthuredelstein: that solves nothing 19:46:02 Yawning: why? 19:46:06 "now the badguys need a Lets encrypt cert to heap spray you" 19:46:22 I do not see that as a large improvement 19:46:25 >.> 19:46:39 I think it would be a significant improvement over the status quo. 19:46:45 Where any exit node can do it. 19:46:46 yeah 19:46:51 true 19:47:10 I agree better still is to disable the JIT completely. 19:47:14 the more I think about it, the more renaming low to something that conveys that it is really dangerous 19:47:17 is a good idea 19:47:27 and new installs should be set to something higher 19:47:39 so when sites break on everything but "Unsafe" 19:47:42 it's obvious who to blame 19:48:04 and your users are already gone 19:48:10 mm 19:49:21 I dunno, have we had a browser vuln that didn't require JS apart from RELAY_EARLY 19:49:36 at some point I think we should say "enough is enough, that shit is off by default" 19:49:46 but I'm starting to rant, so I'll stop now 19:49:51 well JS is not necessarily JIT 19:49:55 because this is a complicated problem 19:50:15 or did you want to get rid of JS as well while you are at it? 19:50:24 :) 19:50:28 well 19:50:38 I think people should have to explicitly increase their attack surface 19:50:40 yes 19:50:48 rather than explicitly increase their security 19:51:09 One problem is the security slider is browser-wide instead of site-specific. 19:51:16 Not that that's easy to solve. 19:51:22 yeah 19:51:34 it'd be nice if it was like noscript 19:51:42 "allow unsafe browser things for this site" 19:51:44 or whatever 19:51:49 but that's probably a huge rat's netst 19:51:57 and months of dev time if not ore 19:52:58 sorry to rant 19:53:00 :/ 19:53:14 alright, i guess this is one of the discussions that will keep on our plate for the near future :) 19:53:19 no worries 19:53:39 I think Yawning is making an important point. We need more data to decide what we can afford to turn off. 19:53:51 Not sure how to get that data though. 19:54:25 We can also consider adding more text to help people choose wisely (and maybe prompting them). 19:54:41 maybe make setting it part of the setup wizard 19:54:56 like, after you configure tor, add a step where it's like 19:55:14 "pick your poison using mega/facebook and geting owned by the FBI, or being secure" 19:55:15 >.> 19:55:23 hah 19:55:30 i think we had this idea back then 19:55:48 but we seemed to think that this would be pretty overwhelming for the normal user 19:56:04 who is usually just opening the browser and starts surfing 19:56:36 What about a periodic reminder to users who are in the low setting? 19:56:52 Like "We notice you are still on the low security setting? Would you like to increase it by any chance?" 19:56:54 like, I know we display the thing on first launch directing people to it 19:57:11 maybe we should bother the UI/UX team 19:57:19 we should 19:58:29 alright. i think we are done for today. thanks for the meeting and i hope all of you get some rest over the holidays 19:58:39 safe travels to those that are 19:58:51 yes, have a great Christmas everyone! 19:58:58 + hopefully 2017 will be less crazy 19:59:14 Thanks, same, happy holidays everyone! 19:59:15 Happy holidays everybody! 19:59:18 (i know, i know but one can still dream) 19:59:23 *BAF* 19:59:26 #endmeeting